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“We need a modern narrative” 
Russia’s eclectic reckoning with its communist past and its glaring 
eschewal of transitional justice has received a fair share of criticism 
across the disciplinary boundaries of political science, law, and 
contemporary history (e.g., Adler 2012a, b; Andrieu 2011; Nuzov 2014; 
Satter 2012; Schlögel 2013; Stan 2009). The controversial politics of 
memory1 during the Putin era, in particular, has been denounced as 
aimed at constructing a new national mythology of the positive 
legacies of the communist period in Russian history, rather than 
accounting for the crimes of the antecedent regime. While human 
rights organizations, such as the “Memorial” Society, have dug into 
the social memory of communism in earnest ever since the gradual 
collapse of the Soviet system, the political elites have generally 
avoided contemplating issues of responsibility and guilt in the 
context of the Second World War, the Soviet suppression of Russia’s 
neighboring nations and states, and mass repressions inflicted on 
the Russian nation itself. The preferred frame of public 
remembrance regarding the violent legacy of communism has been 
the victimhood if not outright martyrdom of the Russian people. 
The tendency to evade questions of accountability by foregrounding 
the immensity of the Russians’ own suffering under the Soviet 
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regime is hardly surprising against the backdrop of a significant 
degree of continuity between the Soviet and post-Soviet elites in 
contemporary Russia (Gill 2013; Sakwa 2011).  
Yet, during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency (2008-12), the 
need for a new mnemonic narrative of communism that would be 
more suitable for Russia’s international image and desired symbolic 
status in international society, was acknowledged in the official 
circles of the country. In June 2010, Konstantin Kosachev, Chair of 
the State Duma Committee for International Affairs, published an 
article wherein he argued that the damage to Russia’s reputation 
was beginning to outweigh the advantages brought by defending the 
Soviet past on the international arena (Kosachev 2010). Accordingly, 
he called for devising a “set of principles, a ‘historical doctrine’ of 
sorts”, in order to clarify Russia’s position with regard to the Soviet 
past in terms that would be easily comprehensible to its foreign 
partners. According to Kosachev, such a strategic move would 
enable a sharp distinction to be drawn between historical 
evaluations of Soviet actions at the domestic and international 
levels. Emphasizing that while Russia fulfilled all the international 
obligations of the USSR as its successor state, it could not be held 
morally or legally responsible for the actions and crimes committed 
by the Soviet authorities, Kosachev sought to protect Russia against 
possible future demands for compensation for the victims of Soviet 
crimes as well as to deflect East European attempts at provoking 
Russia into aggressive responses on the historical memory front 
(Fedor 2010; Torbakov 2011). 
The eminent Russian foreign political heavy-weight Sergei 
Karaganov, head of the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense 
Policy and the chairman of the Standing Committee on Historical 
Memory2 under the Presidential Council for the Development of Civil 
Society and Human Rights delivered, in his turn, a quite remarkable 
programmatic speech on the issue of policy on the Soviet past at a 
meeting with President Medvedev in Yekaterinburg on 1 February 
2011. This meeting was organized by the Presidential Council for the 
Development of Civil Society and Human Rights, a consultative body 
established for assisting, informing, and advising the president in 
	
	
the exercise of his constitutional responsibilities vis-à-vis human 
rights, freedoms, and civil society institutions.3 It brought together 
historians and representatives of social organizations, the 
“Memorial” Society among them. Setting out his vision for 
reconstituting the Russian identity through a re-evaluation of the 
Soviet past, Karaganov claimed that Russian society could not regain 
its self-respect until it faced up to the “terrible sin” that was the 
revolution and the subsequent decades of totalitarian rule 
(Karaganov 2011a). Evoking the notion of samogenotsid (or self-
genocide)4 to describe the Civil War and the Stalinist terror, 
Karaganov’s Yekaterinburg speech built upon some of the points he 
had previously made in another programmatic piece, evocatively 
titled “The Russian Katyn” (Karaganov 2010). In his Yekaterinburg 
speech, Karaganov defined the victims of Soviet terror as “the best” 
of society, and called upon contemporary Russian society to identify 
with these victims, instead of the perpetrators (Karaganov 2011a).5 
He made the case for launching a state-run mass movement aimed 
at memorializing and honoring the victims of political repressions 
during the Soviet period. Arguably, the benefits would include the 
creation of a new patriotic elite with a real sense of responsibility for 
the country; and the earning of respect and good will 
internationally.6 
Accordingly, the Committee on Historical Memory proposed 
a list of measures in 2011 aimed at adjusting the Russian collective 
remembrance of the Soviet experience in the interests of 
Medvedev’s modernization strategy. The cornerstone of these draft 
proposals was the idea that Russia should aim to take a leading role 
in the struggle against totalitarian legacies in post-Soviet and post-
communist space, as the country which had suffered most of all. 
Russia should accordingly spearhead a large-scale memorialization 
campaign throughout the former Soviet space (i.e. the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and the Baltic states), with 
the possibility of eventually expanding this to the broader European 
level, since allegedly “all Europe was a victim, all Europe was guilty 
of the tragedies of the twentieth century—of the two world wars, of 
the two totalitarianisms, of the most severe schism, which has yet to 
	
	
be overcome completely.”7 The proposals included renaming the 
Day of Popular Unity (4 November) as the Day of Remembrance of 
the Victims of the Civil War and National Reconciliation, reflecting 
the view that the totalitarian regime had waged war against the 
people of Russia from 1917 to 1991, and raising the status of 30 
October, the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Political 
Repression in the Russian calendar of political remembrance. In 
addition, the development of a state-supported public campaign for 
the mass construction of monuments to victims of the totalitarian 
regime, and the opening up of the archives was called for. These 
steps were devised to prepare the ground for the political and legal 
assessment of the crimes of the communist regime in order to 
“detotalitarianize” Russian public consciousness. As Karaganov 
maintained in his Yekaterinburg speech, the aim of the project on 
the “Perpetuation of the Memory of the Victims of the Totalitarian 
Regime and National Reconciliation” was “de-Stalinization and de-
Communization of the Russian public mind and our country in 
general”.8 Its main goal was to “ensure transformation of the 
consciousness of both Russian society and the Russian elite”, for: 
modernization of the country will be impossible either at the technical or on 
the political level without changing the consciousness of society, without 
nurturing the people’s sense of responsibility for themselves and for the 
country, the feeling of pride in it, albeit bitter at times (Karaganov 2011a). 
What should we make of these mnemopolitical moves? Did 
these calls for mnemonical modernization subscribe to, or rather 
challenge, the Western power to define the normative meaning of 
what constitutes the proper way of coming to terms with a violent 
past? This process is generally understood as engaging transitional 
justice, that according to a 2004 report by the UN Secretary General, 
comprises “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated 
with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-
scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and 
achieve reconciliation” (UN SecGen 2004: 3). Yet, while Medvedev 
lent his support to some of the good intentions behind the project 
on the “Perpetuation of the Memory of the Victims of the 
	
	
Totalitarian Regime and National Reconciliation”, his backing of the 
“Memorial” Society-driven request for a political-legal judgment of 
the crimes of the communist regime was not forthcoming (see 
“Stenograficheskii otchet” 2011). To date, Russia’s official record in 
the legal, political, administrative and symbolic dimensions of 
addressing the legacy of the Soviet regime has remained at best half-
hearted, if not outright revisionist during the consolidation of the 
current illiberal government. The harassment of “Perm-36” and the 
consequent “self-liquidation” of the NGO managing the country’s 
most important museum of Gulag,9 along with the increasing 
political pressure on civil society organizations, including the 
“Memorial” Society which was originally involved in the drafting of 
proposals for the perpetuation of the memory of the victims of 
political repressions, and the Sakharov Center, are particularly 
evocative reminders of Russia’s mnemopolitical reversal during 
president Putin’s third term in the office. The Russian case has 
accordingly been described as a good counterexample of transitional 
justice for its “faux” or pseudo-transitional justice interventions that 
have been aimed not at democratization and the protection of 
victims’ rights so much as at legitimizing the new political elite 
(Andrieu 2011).   
This article suggests an understanding of the calls for a “new 
historical doctrine”, as aired from the country’s official quarters 
during the Medvedev presidency, through the lens of mimesis. I 
subsequently conceptualize the Medvedev-era “de-
Communization” campaign as an attempt to sustain the “legitimate 
exceptionalism” of Russia’s way of dealing with the Soviet past while 
seeking to do away with being cast as a failure of post-communist 
transitional justice, or, in a sense, an “abnormal” state (cf. Hagström 
2015; Lawson and Tannaka 2011). Below I outline the argument for 
understanding Russia’s quest for a “modern” mnemonic narrative as 
an attempt to “normalize” the country internationally. Taking a cue 
from Ayşe Zarakol’s (2014: 313) suggestion that historical 
stigmatization of non-Western states, inter alia Russia, contributes 
both to their compliance with and rejection of particular 
international norms, I understand the most recent state-supported 
	
	
“de-Stalinization” campaign as an example of mimesis, rather than 
a wholehearted attempt at compliance with the (Western) norm of 
transitional justice. The search for an internationally passable 
mnemonic narrative about Russia’s relationship towards the Soviet 
past as put forth during the Medvedev presidency closely reflects 
Russia’s ongoing quest for a specific status in international society. 
As Zarakol (2014: 313) observes, “emulation and non-compliance are 
at times the two sides of the same coin”. Instead of providing a safe 
route to “international normalcy” then, mimesis ultimately 
threatens the order as defined by the “normal” (ibid.: 316). 
My main claim is that the emphasis on the volume of national 
suffering and self-victimization discourse in the Medvedev-era calls 
to establish a “new historical doctrine” about the communist period 
was not matched by engagement with the issues of responsibility 
and accountability. Depicting Russians as the people who suffered 
most in the Soviet period not only helped to circumvent the 
international implications of the violence perpetrated by the 
communist regime, but also implied a sense of vindication through 
the emphasis on Russia’s self-sacrifice, as though Russians suffered 
and died also for others in the community of nations of the former 
USSR, thus obfuscating the allocation of clear responsibility. While 
Russians were invited to identify with the persecuted, the 
persecutors remained an unidentified tragic force. The allusions of 
overwhelming Russian martyrdom under the Soviet regime hence 
enabled the continuing instrumentalization of a selective 
remembrance of the Soviet experiment for contemporary political 
benefit.  
“Why Be Happy When You Could Be Normal?” (cf. Winterson 
2011) 
Symbolically, the calls for renewed de-Communization of Russia 
under Medvedev appeared to be quite a radical rupture compared 
to Vladimir Putin’s previous terms in the office of the president of 
the Russian Federation which were characterized by the explicit 
distancing of the country from bearing any historical responsibility 
for the crimes of the Soviet regime. Putin’s second term in office 
	
	
(2004-2008), in particular, was marked by various attempts to 
reconnect with the proud moments of Russia’s communist past, 
leading to the securitization and sacralization of the victory of the 
Great Patriotic War, along with the state-orchestrated pompous 
public remembrance of this event. 
The apparent mnemopolitical shift during Medvedev’s 
presidency has been regarded as an obvious ploy aimed at bringing 
Russia’s mnemopolitical arsenal in line with Medvedev’s 
modernization strategy in order to win more “hearts and minds” in 
Europe, and generally improve relations with the West (Sherlock 
2011). The acknowledged need for a modern mnemonic narrative of 
communism tallied with a broader strategic objective to improve 
and project Russia’s “soft power” more efficiently abroad.10 Just as 
Lavrentii Beria, the Minister of Internal Affairs and the first de-
Stalinizer, as unlikely as this might seem, recognized that de-
Stalinization was “a strong weapon in the struggle for power” 
(Khlevniuk, cited in Adler 2002: 77), a similar logic was discernible 
in Karaganov’s contemporary invocation of the term. Since at least 
the Khrushchev era, de-Stalinization has been a way of breaking 
with the immediate past, distancing oneself from the ideology 
and/or actions of one’s predecessors inter alia with the aim of 
“bending with the political winds” (Adler 2002: 77-78).  
I would like to offer an alternative, or rather complementary, 
reading of Russia’s mnemonical reputation management here, 
utilizing insights from post-colonial theory. Taking my cue from 
Bhabha (1994) in particular, Russia’s search for a “modern” 
mnemonic narrative could be interpreted as a hybrid attempt to 
“normalize” the country as an actor in international politics. I depart 
from the premise that Russia’s search for a modern mnemonic 
narrative is a response to the hegemonic construction of East 
European memory of the twentieth century as different from an 
implicit or explicit European “standard account”. The Russian quest 
for mnemonical modernization thus emerges as part of its quest for 
international “normality”, with “modernity” in mnemopolitics 
functioning as the equivalent of such normality. 
	
	
Yet, in order to account more substantively for the Medvedev-
era “de-Stalinization”11 campaign, as it was curiously dubbed, I 
suggest that it might be better understood as a form of resisting the 
hegemonic European discourse about what constitutes a “normal 
relationship” vis-à-vis one’s violent past. This strategy of resistance 
entails seemingly playing along with the terms of the dominant 
discourse, yet ultimately only mimicking, rather than filling out the 
discourse with real actions aimed at “coming to terms” with one’s 
past in earnest. If we view these mnemopolitical moves in Russia 
towards “modernizing” its collective assessment of the communist 
experiment as merely a strategic case of paying lip-service to the 
European expectations about how one should handle the criminal 
legacy of the totalitarian period, then we miss the power of the 
mimetic to potentially redefine the mimicked subject (that is, the 
European conception of a link between democratization and the 
society’s ability and will to deal with a violent past). Besides the 
concern for symbolic power, there are vital issues of respect, 
recognition, and ontological security (or the security of a state’s self-
defined identity) (cf. Mitzen 2006; Steele 2008) involved in the quest 
for “mnemonical modernization”. As Karaganov put it: 
In reality, its [the project’s] main aim is to modernize the consciousness of the Russian people, as well as that of all the 
peoples of the USSR, who were left badly wounded by seventy years of the Communist, totalitarian regime. One of the 
main ways of dealing with this trauma is through showing respect to the millions who perished in Communist times: 
by building monuments for them and tending their graves. In cultivating this sense of respect for them people will 
learn to respect themselves, and each other. It is about giving people back that sense of self-respect. This was not 
developed as an anti-Stalin initiative. De-Stalinization happened in the sixties and later. As I see it, this program deals 
at the fundamental level with restoring people’s faith in themselves (Karaganov 2011b). 
Russia’s post-Soviet mnemopolitical hurdles have indeed 
been exacerbated by the lack of a clearly distinguishable “self” to 
which Russia could have returned after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in order to sustain the consistency of its collective “selfhood”. 
It is hardly surprising, against that backdrop, that contemporary 
Russia’s state-sanctioned memory politics regarding its relationship 
to the Soviet past might be described as ambivalent, to say the least. 
Victory in the “Great Patriotic War” and the mass crimes of the very 
regime that governed and led the country through that war sit 
	
	
uneasily together in the modern Russian mnemonical template, 
marking the poles of ontological security and insecurity, 
respectively. Russia’s difficulties in reckoning with the communist 
past have been magnified by the complicated demands of facing the 
“other in oneself”. 
During his first two terms in the office of the president, 
Vladimir Putin generally distanced Russia from any historical 
responsibility for the crimes of the Soviet regime.12 Gradually, the 
attempts to selectively pick and choose which bits and pieces of the 
Soviet past to cherish and which to forget became more varied with 
cautious recognition also of the darker chapters of the Soviet legacy, 
as exemplified by Putin’s symbolic visit to a key site of the Stalinist 
Great Terror, the Butovo killing field on 30 October 2007, and his 
remarks at the commemoration ceremony of the victims of Katyn 
on 7 April 2010 (see Mälksoo 2012, for further discussion). Medvedev, 
in his turn, forcefully declared his conviction that the “memory of 
national tragedies is as sacred as the memory of victories” 
(Medvedev 2009). As a rule, Russia’s post-Soviet mnemopolitical 
dynamics has nonetheless been replete with status-conscious 
trajectories of an ongoing quest for ontological security as a state in 
international society. Societally, furthermore, Russian people have 
equally sought to retain a basic ontological consistency throughout 
the tumultuous post-Soviet decades—in spite of the fundamental 
difficulties they have faced in integrating the Soviet experience into 
a coherent and positive national “self”. If anything, it was the decade 
of the 1990s which invited “almost universal condemnation” in 
Russia (Prozorov 2008: 208). The immediate post-Cold War 
“memory thaw” proved to be ultimately indecisive, and was followed 
by attempts to re-connect with aspects of the previous socio-
political predicament in order to find some stability after the sudden 
rupture in the ontological sense of the “Russian self” as a result of 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, further intensified by the chaotic 
onslaught of brutal capitalism of the early 1990s. Against that 
backdrop, it is perhaps not so striking that sociological polls have 
persistently quoted significant percentages of the Russian 
population as regarding Stalin as someone who “did more good than 
	
	
bad for the country” (Garagozov 2008: 20), and have indicated a 
general lack of a sense of any responsibility for the crimes 
committed under the Soviet regime (Adler 2005; Khapaeva 2008). In 
the past two years, Stalin’s popularity among Russians has soared 
even further (Monaghan and Gladkova 2015). The issue here might 
be not so much ignorance as indifference, or “an intentional desire 
to ignore the dark sides of the Soviet past” (Khazanov 2008: 294). 
Consequently, attitudes towards the Soviet past are conceived as “a 
matter of values much more than of knowledge” (ibid.; cf. Forest et 
al. 2004: 374). When the overarching value is the security of the self, 
the aspects endangering that security tend to get glossed over or 
rejected entirely. 
All the more dangerous for Russia’s successful post-
communist healing, argue those analysts who have noticed the 
tendency towards shunting the tragic legacy of the Soviet period 
into the sphere of personal remembrance and embracing only the 
heroic in the public commemoration practices in contemporary 
Russia (e.g., Garagozov 2008: 27; Khazanov 2008: 295; cf. Tumarkin 
1994; Merridale 2000). Some are fiercely critical: according to 
Khapaeva’s diagnosis, for instance, Russian society is “seriously ill” 
with a “partial amnesia that makes its historical memory strangely 
selective”. Not only are there “no political debates or hot intellectual 
discussions on how the Soviet crimes influenced and continue to 
influence contemporary Russian society”, but there is also “no 
intellectual or political force that would make post-Soviet society 
face the issue of historical responsibility” (Khapaeva 2008: 359). Not 
surprisingly against that backdrop, there has been no lustration in 
post-Soviet Russia, no criminal prosecution of perpetrators of 
crimes in connection with the administration of the Soviet justice, 
thus leaving “the evil ... insufficiently personified” (Khazanov 2008: 
298). The overall Russian memory of Stalinist repressions has been 
characterized as victim-based, not perpetrator-centric (see further 
Roginski 2008). Nonetheless, the prospect of building an official 
central monument to the victims of political repressions in Russia 
has become realistic only recently.13  
	
	
It is pertinent to inquire here, whether Russia’s long-time 
difficulties related to acknowledging the criminal legacy of its 
predecessor, the USSR, have been determined by the internally 
generated obstacles to self-reflection, or have been rather externally 
generated as a result of Russia’s insecurity in its relationships with 
Europe/the West. As Zarakol (2010: 4) has suggested in the context 
of Japan and Turkey, intersubjective pressures to handle one’s past 
in a particular way matter more at times when traditional self-
routines are broken—and are more likely to create ontological 
insecurity outside the West.  Indeed, it might be reasonable to claim 
that Russia’s difficulties in fully reckoning with its forebear’s legacy 
are related to the complicated demands of ontological security due 
to the still continuing openness of its international belonging (cf. 
Zarakol 2010: 6). Russia’s general non-compliance with the Western 
norm of transitional justice reflects its sensitivity towards the 
particular origin of that norm (cf. Zarakol 2014: 313). Yet, its 
occasional emulation of the transitional justice discourse reveals an 
equal obsession with its perceived position in the socially stratified 
international society of established and still liminal members.  
Mnemopolitics as mimesis 
Departing from the Lacanian point that the making of the self is a 
narrative act (Epstein 2011), I suggest that the Medvedev-era calls for 
a “new historical doctrine” in Russia be understood through the lens 
of mimesis. Following the tripartite distinction of a Canadian 
psychologist and cognitive neuroscientist Merlin W. Donald, 
mimicry, imitation, and mimesis refer to different degrees of 
intensity of the action of (appeared) replication and resemblance. 
While mimicry refers to “the deliberate reduplication in action of a 
perceived event without careful attention to, or knowledge of, its 
purpose”, and imitation pays closer attention to the purpose of 
reduplication, mimesis purposefully reduplicates an event for 
communicative purposes, taking into account the audience (Donald 
2005: 286). It should be noted, though, that mimesis remains “an 
umbrella term that includes imitation and mimicry”, for the levels 
of mimetic action are not distinguished by any discrete boundaries. 
	
	
Rather, Donald argues, the three levels form “a scale of successively 
more abstract or ‘intelligent’ versions of reduplicative action”. 
Mimesis is the most complex of the three, as it requires the 
understanding of not only the purpose of the action, but its various 
social ramifications and interpretations in context as well (Donald 
2005: 286-287).  
Similarly to President Medvedev’s modernization strategy in 
general, the quest for a new historical doctrine of communism 
utilized terms explicitly borrowed from the Western liberal 
democratic discourse while not subjecting the country to the actual 
demands of that discourse, attempting to sustain a specifically 
“Russian way” of handling the communist past instead. Likewise, it 
is important to remember that the Soviet modernizing project 
remained “vitally attached” to the Western modernizing project in 
the first place (Buck-Morss 2002: 68). The presentation of the 
Russian “alternative” is therefore hardly an alternative: by following 
the rules of dominating discourses on dealing with the totalitarian 
legacy, Russia produces the effect of ambivalence—as it has done 
often on previous occasions in history (Morozov and Rumelili 2012), 
thus reproducing its subject position of liminality. We are 
witnessing an instance of subtle resistance here: what substantively 
speaking constitutes a challenge to the master discourse of 
democratic reckoning with the totalitarian legacy is legitimized in 
Russia by presenting hybrid demands within the rules of recognition 
of the dominating discourse so that Russia’s difficult past might be 
handled on its own terms. A subtle, hybrid resistance of this kind is 
allegedly more empowering than outright opposition or exclusion 
(Bhabha 1994: 110; for further discussion, see Polat 2011: 1259-60 and 
1268). Through mimicry and semblance of the “master discourse”, 
yet without following up on the demands of that discourse with 
actual policies of transitional justice not just in symbolic, but also 
legal-political terms, Russian mnemopolitical “modernization” 
effectively constitutes an act of subversion of the said discourse. 
Such mimicry enables the subjugated to reverse its subjugation to 
the hegemonic discourse (see Polat 2011: 1268). More generally, the 
search for a “modern mnemonic narrative” of communism is an 
	
	
offspring of Russia’s mimetic politics—its mimicking of the forms 
and language of the Western discourse of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung14 without substance, or symbolic 
activity without real action (cf. Känd 2013).  
In that sense, the mimetic move in Russia’s official 
mnemopolitical line during the Medvedev presidency sought to 
particularize the universalist discourse on “modern” social memory 
management. The result is the subversion of “democratic memory 
work” as a fixed, universal referent (cf. Polat 2011: 1260). The above-
quoted statements by Karaganov and other members of the Russian 
political elite thus underscore the irrelevance of pondering whether 
and how Russia can modernize in the sphere of its dealing with its 
communist legacy. Instead, they highlight how Russia reproduces, 
reconfigures, and subverts the Western discourses of democratic 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung through its own representational 
practices (cf. Rumelili 2012: 497). Russia’s particularism is hardly 
constitutive of a non-hegemonic or “democratized” understanding 
of what constitutes proper “memory work” in International 
Relations (IR), however. As Rosa Vasilaki rightly points out, 
particularism in the form of regional IR schools is often merely “the 
mirror-image of the logic underpinning Western dominance: based 
on the idea of uniqueness of a ‘special’ civilization, culture or nation, 
its ‘special’ place in the world and its ‘special’ mission, they often 
produce their own versions of hegemony and imperialism” (Vasilaki 
2012: 7; cf. Morozov and Makarychev 2013). Russian representatives’ 
calls for a new historical doctrine that would be more suitable to the 
country’s foreign political interests seek to, on the one hand, 
reposition Russia as part of the West/Europe, essentially 
reproducing the terms of the Western discourse on “good memory 
work”. On the other hand, the limited, and as such, subversive, way 
Russia substantiates its turn towards condemning the violent legacy 
of communism only reproduces its own ambiguity vis-à-vis 
“Western standards”, as well as ultimately sustaining its liminal 
position in European (identity) politics (Rumelili 2012: 498). As 
Morozov and Rumelili have aptly pointed out: 
Russia’s role as a Europe-maker is presently determined by the fact that it is 
	
	
unhappy about its exclusion from the European political space, [and] tries to 
challenge this exclusion, but this challenge is certainly very far from being a 
radical one. Instead of confronting western/EU hegemony, Russia, in 
Gramscian terms, prefers to wage a war of position whose main parameters 
are defined by the hegemonic force. This inevitably leads to a situation where 
hegemony is being reproduced and even, precisely due to this challenge, 
tends to consolidate (Morozov and Rumelili 2012: 42). 
Russia’s mimesis of de-Communization under Medvedev thus 
ultimately emerges as a productive hegemonic, rather than 
explicitly counter-hegemonic strategy, for it has arranged discursive 
elements of the dominant discourse so as to “promote the goal, the 
aims and the objective of a hegemony” (Herschinger 2012: 76). 
Whether or not it really will follow the suggested course of 
condemning the crimes of the communist regime in the form of real 
actions in this direction remains to be seen. While retrospective 
justice can involve either perpetrators, victims or both, it defeats the 
purpose of its main goal (that is, justice) if any distinction between 
the two categories is eschewed by collapsing everyone, victims and 
perpetrators alike, into the category of “victims” of a greater tragic 
force.15 The Russian state has generally encouraged regarding the 
Stalin-era crimes as “tragedies” and has conceived of the Russian 
people as first and foremost victims (e.g., Putin 2007). Selective 
demonization of the supreme leader and his henchmen has allowed 
the Russian people to be absolved of all responsibility and to avoid 
grappling with the difficult questions of complicity, intentional and 
unintentional, making it essentially seem as if the Soviet regime 
existed without the Soviet people (Ferretti 2003: 55, 58). The result, 
as Maria Ferretti claims, is that the Russian people suffer from a 
“memory disorder”—since the mourning for the victims of the 
Soviet regime has not been completed, a sense of (unhealthy) 
melancholia has ensued which continues to hinder the construction 
of a new democratic identity for Russia (cf. Etkind 2013).  
Hence, there has been a general inclination to handle the 
repressive Soviet legacy, both societally and by the current regime 
in Russia, as a series of essentially nameless, and thus also agentless 
tragedies (Etkind 2009; Khazanov 2008). It is difficult to admit the 
criminal legacy of the predecessor state if one is simultaneously 
	
	
attempting to inherit the “good legacy”. Such mnemonical cherry-
picking is hardly consistent. Yet, admitting self-critically to a certain 
agency inherited from the Soviet Union would inevitably require 
Russia to reconsider its sense of self, to revise its current major 
identity-narrative. The temptation to emphasize the “good” legacy 
at the expense of disregarding the “bad” is naturally human—and 
thus always present. Russia’s long-time reluctance to reckon with 
the criminal legacy of communism should not be particularly 
puzzling against that backdrop, but rather consistent with its 
attempts to maintain the basic consistency of a positive sense of its 
social “self”. 
Conclusion 
The question of to what extent the current Russian regime can adapt 
to the de-legitimization of the Soviet regime without destabilizing 
itself to the core, remains a valid one. Without acknowledging and 
denouncing the role of state security structures in the criminal legacy 
of the communist experiment, the coming to terms with the Soviet 
past in Russia would hardly meet the bulk of implicit and explicit 
Western criteria of full-scale Vergangenheitsbewältigung. 
Transitional justice was originally conceived as “handmaiden to 
liberal political transitions” (Sharp 2014), or a core component of 
modernization based on the Western democratic model. Russia’s 
osobyi put’ of coming to terms with its communist past points 
towards a diversion from this model. As regards lustration, and 
assessment of the role of the security structures in the previous 
regime’s criminal legacy, this sort of “coming to terms with the past” 
is unlikely to happen in a Russia governed by a former KGB-
operative, actively setting the standards of the “new normal” in 
Russia’s post-Soviet neighborhood via its political and military 
engagement in the Ukrainian crisis. The initiatives of the Standing 
Committee on Historical Memory under the Presidential Council for 
the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights aimed at 
acknowledgement of the mass crimes of the communist regime still 
remain to be matched by atonement for these crimes, and the 
recognition of the full human worth of their victims. Except for the 
	
	
rehabilitation of the victims of the communist political repressions, 
a clear structural, political, and symbolic break with the past is yet 
to happen in contemporary Russia. Without facing the entire moral 
and political implications of the communist experience, Russia’s 
“breaking with its communist past” remains incomplete (Satter 2012: 
300-305). The 2014 “memory law” targeting the “dissemination of 
intentionally false information about the activities of the Soviet 
Union during the Second World War” and the “rehabilitation of 
Nazism” (for discussion, see Koposov 2014; Kurilla 2014; Mälksoo 
2015) is a painful reminder of the fact that the trend towards 
“mnemonical modernization” has apparently gone into full reversal 
after Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012.  
What, then, does the Medvedev-era search for a modern 
mnemonic narrative tell us about Russia’s readiness to revise its 
central narrative of a national “self”? Medvedev’s administration 
apparently understood the positive political effects of softening the 
hardline stance on boasting the achievements of the Stalin era at the 
price of belittling the crimes of his regime. It was gradually dawning 
upon the political elite that the absence of denials and selective 
glorification of the communist past would likely facilitate Russia’s 
rapprochement with the states formerly in its sphere of influence, as 
well as create a benevolent atmosphere for the EU-Russia 
partnership for modernization. 
However, the suggested path of victim-centric remembrance 
of the darker chapters of the Soviet period does not firmly indicate 
a willingness for self-critical memory work that would also consider 
the issues of agency, responsibility and regret along with depicting 
oneself as the greatest victim, or greatest martyr of all. While moral 
masochism and a cult of suffering are allegedly symptomatic for the 
Russian psyche and its cultural tradition (Rancour-Laferriere 1995), 
relating to the Soviet past primarily through a sense of martyrdom 
can hardly be considered a constructive way of engaging with and 
learning from the past (cf. Etkind 2013). Common catchphrases 
about overcoming the negative heritage of the past amount to no 
more than hollow parroting here. Instead, one can only agree with 
Denis Sekirinsky (2011), the academic secretary of the National 
	
	
Committee of Russian Historians, that what is needed in order to 
overcome the negative heritage of Russia’s communist past is the 
emancipation of people, first and foremost, by “turning them into 
personalities and citizens able to think independently, make their 
own decisions and be responsible for their behavior.”  
	
1  The notions “mnemopolitics” and “politics of memory” are used 
interchangeably here, referring to the political coordination and sanctioning of 
particular narratives of the past, generally manufactured, although hardly ever 
entirely controlled, by elites. Likewise, “mnemonic” is used as shorthand for 
“memory-related” in the text. For a “Historically Realist” take on the politics of 
memory, see Berger (2012). 
2  Established in 2011, see further at: http://president-
sovet.ru/about/comissions/permanent/read/5/ (accessed 11 June 2015). 
3      See http://en.kremlin.ru/structure/councils#institution-18 (accessed 10 June 
2015). For a discussion, see Owen (2012). 
4     The focus on Stalin´s USSR´s responsibility for domestic genocide evades,    
however, the discussion of its international genocidal activity in the Second 
World War (see further Shaw 2013: 78; Naimark 2010; Werth 2008). 
5  Quite symptomatically, his speech nonetheless displayed the blurring and thus 
fundamental relativization of the categories of victims and perpetrators: “We 
all should bow low to the millions of victims. After all, the butchers were 
victims, too.” Later on in the speech, he argued that: “all countries of the former 
Soviet Union ... were among the victims—and among the executioners, too” 
(Karaganov 2011a).  
6  “Some fear that recognizing in full the horrors of the Gulag and declassifying all 
the archives would damage the prestige of the country. They will not. 
Perpetuation of the memory of the victims of the totalitarian regime can only 
evoke respect. /--/… Russia is one large Katyn, with the thousands of graves of 
millions of the best citizens of the USSR. By paying respects to their memory in 
all the villages and cities, from where they were sent to labor camps or for death, 
to their mostly nameless graves, we shall regain not only self-esteem, but also 
the respect of all normal people in the world. After all, we shall do so ourselves, 
without coercion or pressure from outside, not by compulsion, as losers, but 
voluntarily” (Karaganov 2011a). 
7  See further http://www.rg.ru/2011/04/08/repress.html (accessed 11 June 2015). 
8 For the full transcript of the event, see “Stenograficheskii otchet” (2011). 
9   See further http://www.perm36.ru/ru/novosti/novosti/724-ano-zakryvaetsya-
rabota-prodolzhaetsya.html (accessed 11 June 2015). 
10  As bluntly exemplified by Karaganov, yet again, in the following excerpt: “Russia 
should fight for positions on the market of ideas and images, since they are 
playing a much greater role today than ever in the past. The alternative is an 




																																								 																																							 																																							 								
propaganda tools, but not only them. One must understand what brands, 
images and ideas can be sold. And it is even more important to ensure that 
Russian intellectuals, who are the main producers of ideas and images for the 
country and for the whole world, begin to side with their homeland and—at 
least partially—with the government. But this is again a problem of our inner 
organization, which we will have to restructure anyway. If we do not, the result 
will be a flop in international competition” (Karaganov 2012). 
11  The concept of de-Stalinization goes way back to the mid-twentieth century. 
According to Adler (2002: 239), “[a]fter the death of Stalin, state policy traversed 
the spectrum from de-Stalinization to re-Stalinization to de-Stalinization to de-
Sovietization”. It is perhaps only symptomatic that the most recent calls for de-
Sovietization have been dubbed as “de-Stalinization” in popular media yet 
again. On the intricacies of previous rounds in the long process of Russian de-
Stalinization, see also van Goudoever (1986).  
12  This sentiment has been generally shared societally as well, as arguably the vast 
majority of Russians refuse to admit any collective responsibility for the Soviet 
regime. Partly, this is due to the fact that there has hardly been another case 
but the Soviet Russia where the boundaries between perpetrators, accomplices 
and victims have been so blurred (Viola 2013; Khazanov 2008: 300-301).  
13      See further http://konkurs.gmig.ru/ (accessed 11 June 2015). 
14  The German term for the process of coming to terms with the totalitarian past 
has become a universal shorthand for a general phenomenon in post-war 
European mnemopolitics, betraying thus the particularist origins of the 
contemporary Western “rule of thumb” in dealing with the legacies of 
totalitarian rule according to a set of normative expectations and standards. 
15  Cf. Karaganov and Fedotov (2011): “One cannot demand that victims assume 
responsibility for the barbarities committed against them! At the same time, we 
must explicitly condemn the heinous crimes of the totalitarian regime and declare 
that we do not have (and do not want to have) anything in common with them. 
Not the slightest shade of blame must rest on those Soviet people who had to live 
in those difficult years, who grew grain, built houses, hunted down thieves, served 
in the army, and composed symphonies. They lived the only possible kind of life 
in those inhuman times. But we must renounce the crimes of that regime.” 
	
References 
Adler, N. (2002) Beyond the Soviet System: The Gulag Survivor. New Brunswick and 
London: Transaction Publishers. 
________ (2005) “The Future of the Soviet Past Remains Unpredictable: The 
Resurrection of Stalinist Symbols amidst the Resurrection of Mass Graves”, 
Europe-Asia Studies 57(8): 1093-1119. 
	
	
																																								 																																							 																																							 								
________ (2012a) “Reconciliation with—or Rehabilitation of—the Soviet Past?”, 
Memory Studies 5(3): 327-338. 
________ (2012b) “‘The Bright Past’, or Whose (Hi)story? Challenges in Russia and 
Serbia Today”, FILOZOFIJA I DRUŠTVO XXIII(4): 119-138. 
Andrieu, K. (2011) “An Unfinished Business: Transitional Justice and 
Democratization in Post-Soviet Russia”, The International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 5(2): 198-220. 
Berger, T. U. (2012) War, Guilt, and World Politics after World War II. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bhabha, H.K. (1994) The Location of Culture. London: Routledge. 
Buck-Morss, S. (2002) Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in 
East and West. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Donald, M. W. (2005) “Imitation and Mimesis”, in N. Chater and S. Hurley (eds), 
Perspectives on Imitation: From Neuroscience to Social Science: Imitation, 
Human Development and Culture. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 283-300. 
Epstein, C. (2011) “Who Speaks? Discourse, the Subject and the Study of Identity in 
International Politics”, European Journal of International Relations 17(2): 327-
350. 
Etkind, A. (2009) “Post-Soviet Hauntology: Cultural Memory of the Soviet Terror”, 
Constellations. An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory 16(1): 
182-200. 
________. (2013) Warped Mourning: Stories of the Undead in the Land of the 
Unburied. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
	
	
																																								 																																							 																																							 								
Fedor, J. (2010) “Kosachev Offers Another Sign of Shift in Official Russian Position 
on the Soviet Past”, Memory at War: Blog, 29 July,   
http://cambridgeculturalmemory.blogspot.com/2010/07/kosachev-offers-
another-sign-of-shift.html (accessed: 28 May 2015). 
Ferretti, M. (2003) “Memory Disorder: Russia and Stalinism”, Russian Politics and 
Law 41(6): 38-82. 
Forest, B., J. Johnson and K. Till (2004) “Post-Totalitarian National Identity: Public 
Memory in Germany and Russia”, Social and Cultural Geography 5(3): 357-380. 
Garagozov, R. (2008) “Historical Choice and the Characteristics of Collective 
Experience”, Journal of Russian and East European Psychology 46(1): 19-51. 
Gill, G. (2013) Symbolism and Regime Change in Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
van Goudoever, A.P. (1986) The Limits of Destalinization in the Soviet Union: Political 
Rehabilitations in the Soviet Union since Stalin. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Hagström, L. (2015) “The ‘Abnormal’ State: Identity, Norm/Exception and Japan”, 
European Journal of International Relations 21(1): 122-145.  
Herschinger, E. (2012) “‘Hell Is the Other’: Conceptualizing Hegemony and Identity 
through Discourse Theory”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 41(1): 
65-90. 
Karaganov, S. (2010) “Russian Katyn”, Rossiiskaia gazeta, 22 July. 
	
	
																																								 																																							 																																							 								
________. (2011a) Speech at a meeting of the Council on Civil Society and Human 
Rights. Yekaterinburg, 1 February. Available at: 
http://karaganov.ru/en/news/230 (accessed: 28 May 2014). 
________. (2011b) “When Will Russia be Free from Totalitarian Mentality?”, Valdai 
Discussion Club, 20 July. Available at: http://valdaiclub.com/history/28660.html 
(accessed: 28 May 2014). 
________. (2012) “Russia in the World of Ideas and Images”, Russia in Global Affairs, 
21 October. Available at: http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/Russia-in-the-
World-of-Ideas-and-Images-15709 (accessed: 28 May 2015). 
Karaganov, S. and M. Fedotov (2011) “The Judgment Century”, Rossiiskaia gazeta, 27 
July.  
Känd, K. (2013) “Euraasia Liit—unelm, vimm või tegelikkus?”, Diplomaatia 116. 
Khapaeva, D. (2009) “Historical Memory in Post-Soviet Gothic Society”, Social 
Research 76 (1): 359-394. 
Khazanov, A. (2008) “Whom to Mourn and Whom to Forget? (Re)constructing 
Collective Memory in Contemporary Russia”, Totalitarian Movements and 
Political Religions 9(2-3): 293-310. 
Koposov, N. (2014) “Pamiat’ v zakone: Pro istoriiu”, Russkii zhurnal, 8 April. Available 
at: http://www.russ.ru/Mirovaya-povestka/Pamyat-v-zakone (accessed: 28 May 
2015).  
Kosachev, K. (2010) “Sovetskaia li Rossiia?”, Ekho Moskvy, 29 June. 
Kurilla, I. (2014) “The Implications of Russia’s Law against the ‘Rehabilitation of 
Nazism’”. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 331 (August). Available at: 
	
	
																																								 																																							 																																							 								
http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-
pdf/Pepm331_Kurilla_August2014_0.pdf (accessed 28 May 2015). 
Lawson, S. and S. Tannaka (2011) “War Memories and Japan’s ‘Normalization’ as an 
International Actor: A Critical Analysis”, European Journal of International 
Relations 17(3): 405-428. 
Mälksoo, M. (2012) “Nesting Orientalisms at War: World War II and the ´Memory 
War´ in Eastern Europe”, in T. Barkawi and K. Stanski (eds), Orientalism and 
War. New York: Columbia University Press, 177-195. 
________ (2015) “‘Memory Must Be Defended’: Beyond the Politics of Mnemonical 
Security”, Security Dialogue: 1-17, DOI: 10.1177/0967010614552549 (ahead of print 
article). 
Makarychev, A. and V. Morozov (2013) “Is ‘Non-Western Theory’ Possible? The Idea 
of Multipolarity and the Trap of Epistemological Relativism in Russian IR”, 
International Studies Review 15(3): 328-350. 
Medvedev, D. (2009) “Pamiat’ o natsional’nykh tragediiakh tak zhe sviashchenna, 
kak pamiat’ o pobedakh”, Address on the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of 
Political Repression, 30 October. Available at: 
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/5862 (accessed 28 May 2015). 
Merridale, C. (2000) Night of Stone: Death and Memory in Twentieth Century Russia. 
New York: Penguin. 
Mitzen, J. (2006) “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the 
Security Dilemma”, European Journal of International Relations 12(3): 341–370. 
	
	
																																								 																																							 																																							 								
Monaghan, J., Gladkova, Y. (2015) “Was Stalin´s Terror Justified? Poll Shows More 
Russians Think It Was”, The Moscow Times, 31 March. Available at: 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/was-stalins-terror-justified-
poll-shows-more-russians-think-it-was/518298.html (accessed 28 May 2015). 
Morozov, V. and B. Rumelili (2012) “The External Constitution of European Identity: 
Russia and Turkey as Europe-makers”, Cooperation and Conflict 47(1): 28-48. 
Naimark, N. (2010) Stalin´s Genocides. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Nuzov, I. (2014) “The Role of Political Elite in Transitional Justice in Russia: From 
False ‘Nurembergs’ to Failed Desovietization”, U.C. Davis Journal of 
International Law and Policy 20(2): 273-321. 
Owen, Catherine (2012) “Is the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human 
Rights ´Democratic´? Implications for Russian Governance, Foreign Policy 
Centre, 5 December. Available at: http://fpc.org.uk/articles/573 (accessed 11 
June 2015). 
Polat, N. (2011) “European Integration as Colonial Discourse”, Review of 
International Studies 37(3): 1255-1272. 
Prozorov, S. (2008) “Russian Post-Communism and the End of History”, Studies in 
East European Thought 60: 207-230. 
Putin, V. (2007) Remarks at the Butovo Shooting Range, 30 October.  
Rancour-Laferriere, D. (1995) The Slave Soul of Russia: Moral Masochism and a Cult 
of Suffering. New York and London: New York University Press. 
Roginski, A. (2008) “Fragmented Memory: Stalin and Stalinism in Present-day 
Russia”, Eurozine, 5 December. Available at: 
	
	
																																								 																																							 																																							 								
http://www.eurozine.com/articles/article_2009-03-02-roginski-en.html 
(accessed 28 May 2015). 
Rumelili, B. (2012) “Liminal Identities and Processes of Domestication and 
Subversion in International Relations”, Review of International Studies 38(2): 
495-508. 
Sakwa, R. (2011) The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism and 
the Medvedev Succession. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Satter, D. (2012) It Was a Long Time Ago, and It Never Happened Anyway: Russia and 
the Communist Past. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
Schlögel, K. (2013) “The Cube on Red Square: A Memorial for the Victims of 
Twentieth-century Russia”, in M. Silberman and F. Vatan (eds), Memory and 
Postwar Memorials: Confronting the Violence of the Past. London and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 31-50. 
Sekirinskiy, D. (2011) “Why We Still Cross Swords on Stalin?”, Valdai discussion club, 
11 May. Available: http://valdaiclub.com/history/24900.html (accessed 28 May 
2015). 
Shaw, M. (2013) Genocide and International Relations: Changing Patterns in the 
Transitions of the Late Modern World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sherlock, T. (2011) “Confronting the Stalinist Past: The Politics of Memory in Russia”, 
The Washington Quarterly 34(2): 93-109. 
Stan, L. (2009) “Former Soviet Union”, in L. Stan (ed.), Transitional Justice in Eastern 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union: Reckoning with the Communist Past. 
London and New York: Routledge, 222-246. 
	
	
																																								 																																							 																																							 								
Steele, B. J. (2008) Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and 
the IR State. New York: Routledge. 
“Stenograficheskii otchet” (2011) Stenograficheskii otchet o zasedanii Soveta po 
razvitiiu obshchestva i pravam cheloveka, Yekaterinburg, 1 February. Available 
at: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/10194 (accessed 28 May 
2015). 
Torbakov, I. (2011) “History, Memory and National Identity: Understanding the 
Politics of History and Memory Wars in Post-Soviet Lands”, Demokratizatsiya 
19(3): 209-232. 
Tumarkin, N. (1994) The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World 
War II in Russia. New York: Basic Books.  
UN Secretary General (2004) The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies 8 U.N. Doc.S/2004/616 (23 August). 
Vasilaki, R. (2012) “Provincialising IR? Deadlocks and Prospects in Post-Western IR 
Theory”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 41(1): 3-22. 
Viola, L. (2013) “The Question of the Perpetrator in Soviet History”, Slavic Review 
72(1): 1-23. 
Werth, N. (2008) “Crimes of the Stalin Regime: Outline for an Inventory and 
Classification”, in D. Stone (ed.), The Historiography of Genocide. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 400-19. 




																																								 																																							 																																							 								
Zarakol, A. (2010) “Ontological (In)Security and State Denial of Historical Crimes: 
Turkey and Japan”, International Relations 24(1): 3-23. 
________. (2014) “What Made the Modern World Hang Together—Socialisation or 
Stigmatisation?”, International Theory 6(2): 311-332. 
 
